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INDEPENDENCE DAY?
1 INTRODUCTION
Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose
solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of
independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We ar-
gue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit
assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation
does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic independencies. We
show, however, that this assumption is implausible, as updating beliefs with con-
ditional information does not in general preserve independencies. We conclude
that the approach taken by van Rooij and Lassiter does not succeed in resolving
the proviso problem.
2 THE PROVISO PROBLEM
Standard theories of semantic presupposition,1 in particular satisfaction theory,
predict that the strongest semantic presupposition of an indicative conditional
with the form of (1) (where BP is a sentence with a presupposition P) is the
material conditional (2):2
(1) If A then BP
(2) A ⊃ P
These theories make similar predictions for presupposition triggers embedded in
right conjuncts and disjuncts (with ‘ ’ meaning ‘presupposes’):
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nous variety of other theories, e.g., Soames 1982, Schlenker 2008, Chemla 2008.
2Capital roman letters stand for sentences; corresponding italic letters stand for the propositions they
express (suppressing reference to contexts for readability). Following van Rooij and Lassiter, we focus on
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(3) A and BP
  A ⊃ P
(4) A or BP
  ¬A ⊃ P
Are these predictions correct? According to satisfaction theory, the presuppo-
sitions of a sentence are contents that an input context must entail before the
sentence can be added to the context. Consider an example (modified slightly)
from Geurts 1996:
(5) If Theo hates sonnets, then so does his wife.
According to the predictions just reviewed, given that ‘his [Theo’s] wife’ pre-
supposes that Theo has a wife, (5) presupposes the material conditional (6)
(perhaps most naturally realized in natural language as the truth-conditionally
equivalent disjunction in (7)):
(6) Theo hates sonnets ⊃ Theo has a wife.
(7) Theo doesn’t hate sonnets or Theo has a wife.
Now consider a context which entails (7). One way to imagine such a context is
to imagine, for instance, that Mark has asserted (7) and it has been accepted
in the context. Then suppose that Susie asserts (5). According to satisfaction
theory, the presupposition of (5) is satisfied in this context, and so we will not
be required to accommodate any new presuppositions when (5) is asserted—that
is, we will not need to quietly adjust the input context in order to make sure that
(5)’s presuppositions are all satisfied. And indeed, this seems to be just what
we observe. In particular, in such a context, an assertion of (5) is not felt to
presuppose that Theo has a wife. One classic test for presupposition is the ‘Hey
wait a minute’-test [von Fintel, 2008]: in the context in question, responding to
(5) with something like ‘Hey wait a minute! I didn’t know Theo had a wife!’ feels
like a non sequitur. This result is consistent with the predictions of satisfaction
theory.
But problems arise when we consider an assertion of (5) in a context that
does not already entail its presupposition in (6). For instance, consider a context
in which nothing is known about Theo, and suppose that Susie asserts (5). Susie
will ordinarily be felt to be presupposing not just the material conditional (6),
but also its unconditional consequent: that Theo has a wife. The easiest way to
see this, again, is to note that, in this context—unlike the one just imagined—a
response to (5) with ‘Hey wait a minute! I didn’t know Theo has a wife!’ feels
entirely appropriate. This suggests that the presupposition we accommodate in
this context—what we add to the common ground to render Susie’s assertion
felicitous—is something stronger than the predicted conditional presupposition
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(6) of (5), and instead is the unconditional consequent of (6).
Examples like this one have led to a consensus in the literature that the
predictions of satisfaction theory about the presupposition of (5) seem perfectly
adequate when we focus on contexts which already entail that presupposition. But
when we look at contexts in which something must be accommodated, it looks
as though we are inclined to accommodate something much stronger than what
satisfaction theory predicts we have to accommodate. Similar issues arise for
conjunctions and disjunctions.
This gap between the predicted conditional semantic presuppositions of com-
plex sentences embedding presupposition triggers, on the one hand, and the
observed unconditional propositions which we accommodate when the condi-
tional presupposition is not already common ground, on the other, is the proviso
problem. The name was given by Geurts [1996], but the problem has been
recognized at least since Karttunen and Peters 1979. Let us emphasize that this
is a problem about accommodation in particular. Geurts [1996, p. 270–271] is
particularly clear about the link between the proviso problem and accommo-
dation: he argues that if the satisfaction theory could only make the correct
prediction about accommodation in cases like (5) then there would be no pro-
viso problem. That is, the predictions made by satisfaction theories which are
apparently problematic are just its predictions about accommodations. Heim
2006 puts this point particularly clearly: ‘When the predicted conditional pre-
supposition is in the common ground, the [relevant] sentences are felicitous and
don’t require additional accommodation. The [problematic] judgments. . . are
judgments about what we spontaneously accommodate when presented with
out-of-the-blue utterances.’ (See also von Fintel 2008, 160–161 for the same
point.) We emphasize this here because neither van Rooij or Lassiter frames
the proviso problem as a problem about accommodation in particular.3 In this
paper we adapt their views slightly—and charitably, we hope—to explicitly cover
the case of accommodation (i.e. to cover cases in which the context before the
utterance is not one in which the speaker can assume the listener has already
accepted the presupposition).4
Before proceeding, we should note that, in two important classes of cases, the
predictions of satisfaction theory seem to be vindicated. The first class comprises
sentences like (8):
(8) If Theo has a wife, his wife hates sonnets.
Satisfaction theory predicts that the presupposition of (8) is ‘Theo has a wife ⊃
Theo has a wife’, which is, of course, a tautology, and thus satisfaction theory
predicts that (8) has no non-trivial presuppositions. This prediction seems to be
3Thanks to two anonymous referees for noting this point.
4In Lassiter’s framework, these are cases in which the speaker cannot assume the listener has already
conformed their credences to the presuppositional requirements.
3
correct: there are no contexts in which someone who asserts (8) will be felt to
presuppose that Theo has a wife. (This point, while important to keep in mind,
will not play much of a role in what follows.)
Second, in some cases, we do seem to accommodate the predicted conditional
presupposition of satisfaction theory. Consider (9):5
(9) If Buganda is a monarchy, then Buganda’s king will be at the meeting.
If someone asserts (9) in a null context, we will typically accommodate (10),
not (11):
(10) Buganda is a monarchy ⊃ Buganda has a king.
(11) Buganda has a king.
(10) is non-trivial—monarchies can have queens as well—and yet in this case
we really do seem to accommodate a conditional, whereas in (5) we did not. An
adequate solution to the proviso problem must make sense not only of the fact
that, in cases like (5), we accommodate something stronger than the predicted
conditional presupposition, but also of the fact that, in cases like this one, we
accommodate just the conditional.
3 TWO NOTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE
Van Rooij [2007] and Lassiter [2012] propose closely related solutions to the
proviso problem: accounts which aim to explain why we accommodate something
unconditional in cases like (5) (if we have to accommodate something at all),
but only a conditional in cases like (9). Both accounts make crucial use of a
notion of independence. We begin our discussion of these accounts by defining
the two notions and discussing the relationship between them.
We begin with van Rooij’s notion of QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE (our term).
Van Rooij’s paper in fact defines two distinct notions of independence. Van Rooij
claims these are equivalent, but, as we show in Appendix A, they turn out not to
be. However, as far as we can tell, this fact is inessential to the main thrust of van
Rooij’s theory, and so we think the most charitable option is to ignore the first
notion of independence and focus on the second; see Appendix A for discussion
of why we think this is the right notion of the two to focus on. Apart from this
(we hope charitable) emendation—and the generalization of the account to
cover accommodation explicitly—our summary of van Rooij’s theory is intended
to be faithful to his presentation.
Van Rooij is working in a standard Boolean framework in which a background
context can be characterized as a set of possible worlds from a stock of worlds W ,
and propositions are also subsets of W . Van Rooij adopts satisfaction theory as
his theory of semantic presupposition, on which presuppositions are propositions
5Following many similar examples in the literature; see Geurts 1996, Beaver 2001.
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which must be entailed by their input contexts. The central notion in van Rooij’s
account is that of the qualitative independence of A and B, relative to a context
s:6
Propositions A and B are QUALITATIVELY INDEPENDENT in a context s
iff
a) if A∩ s 6= ; ∧ B ∩ s 6= ; then A∩ B ∩ s 6= ;
b) if Ac ∩ s 6= ; ∧ B ∩ s 6= ; then Ac ∩ B ∩ s 6= ;
c) if A∩ s 6= ; ∧ Bc ∩ s 6= ; then A∩ Bc ∩ s 6= ;
d) if Ac ∩ s 6= ; ∧ Bc ∩ s 6= ; then Ac ∩ Bc ∩ s 6= ;.
The notion of independence that plays a key role for Lassiter is closely related,
but is probabilistic rather than qualitative. Lassiter argues that the operative
notion of an information state in the theory of presupposition should not be a
context (a set of possible worlds), but rather a probability function over a set
of possible worlds. Lassiter proposes that presuppositions need not be entailed
by their input context, in the standard qualitative sense, but rather must have
high probability (higher than a threshold t) in their local information state.
The notion of independence that plays a key role in Lassiter’s theory is just the
standard probabilistic one:
Propositions A and B are PROBABILISTICALLY INDEPENDENT relative
to a probability function p iff p(A∩ B) = p(B)p(A).
There is a precise sense in which Lassiter and van Rooij’s notions are related:
for a finite set of worlds W , subsets A and B of W are qualitatively independent
in a context s just in case there is a probability space built on W which assigns
non-zero probability to all and only the worlds of s, and which makes A and B
probabilistically independent. The proof is in Appendix B. At a high level, this
fact shows that there is a sense in which qualitative independence is the corollary
of probabilistic independence in a qualitative framework, though also a sense in
which it is weaker.
4 FROM INDEPENDENCE TO STRENGTHENING
Now we are in a position to see how van Rooij and Lassiter use their notions of
independence to try to solve the proviso problem.
In both cases we apply their accounts to cases in which a presupposition
needs to be accommodated rather than cases in which a presupposition is already
accepted in the context. We do this because, as we argued in Section 2, these
cases which are problematic for a satisfaction-style theory. It is in these cases that
the satisfaction theory struggles to explain why we accommodate unconditional
presuppositions when conditional presuppositions should be sufficient.
6Where P is a proposition, P c is its complement in W , i.e. W \ P.
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We begin with van Rooij, who, recall, is working in the framework of satis-
faction theory. Suppose the conditional ðIf A, then BPñ is asserted in a context c
which does not already include A⊃ P. This, again, is the case that is of interest
to us, since there is no problem for satisfaction theory in cases in which A⊃ P
is already entailed by the input context. According to satisfaction theory, this
presupposition will need to be accommodated: quietly added to the context so
that we can process the assertion. In particular, the context after accommodation
(call it c′) will have to entail A⊃ P. Van Rooij assumes, following Stalnaker 1975,
that a conditional can only be asserted when its antecedent is compatible with
the context, so A is compatible with c; van Rooij is not explicit about it, but he
must be assuming that A must remain compatible with c through the process of
accommodation, so A is also compatible with c′. Now suppose that A and P are
qualitatively independent in c, and remain independent in the posterior context
c′. The only way these conditions can all be met is if c′ entails P. Otherwise,
there would be P c worlds in c′, and since we know there are A worlds in c′, there
would have to be A∩ P c worlds in c′, by the qualitative independence of A and
P, contrary to the assumption that c′ entails A⊃ P.
In short, if A and P are qualitatively independent in a context, and that
qualitative independence is preserved through the process of accommodation when
ðIf A, then BPñ is asserted, then P, and not just A⊃ P, will be entailed by the
posterior context.
And how does this story help with the proviso problem? Van Rooij’s idea is
that, as a matter of empirical fact, the conditional presuppositions which we
tend to strengthen are just those which are qualitatively independent in most
contexts. To compare the two key examples from above, Theo hates sonnets will
typically be treated as qualitatively independent of Theo has a wife, and so we
will generally strengthen ‘Theo hates sonnets ⊃ Theo has a wife’ to ‘Theo has a
wife’ when we have to accommodate this presupposition. By contrast, Buganda
has a king will often not be treated as qualitatively independent of Buganda has
a monarchy, since there will be no worlds where Buganda fails to be a monarchy
but still has a king; and so ‘Buganda is a monarchy ⊃ Buganda has a king’ is
correctly predicted to remain unstrengthened.
Lassiter’s story is similar to van Rooij’s, albeit in a slightly different background
setting (and with some interesting empirical differences on which, however, we
will not focus).7 Lassiter’s theory of presupposition is a probabilistic variant of
satisfaction theory: when ðIf A, then BPñ is asserted, on Lassiter’s theory, speakers
must ensure that the conditional probability of P on A is suitably high— that
is, is above some threshold t.8 In this framework, the proviso problem arises
7A similar idea to Lassiter’s can be found in Singh 2007, 2008, Schlenker 2011.
8Lassiter thinks speakers can only assert something if they believe its presuppositions are given a high
conditional probability by themselves as well as by their audience (as in his (9) on p. 10). So we can,
loosely, think of Lassiter as also putting a condition on the ‘context’ or ‘common ground’. We speak in this
way throughout the paper in order to emphasize the connections between Lassiter’s paper and traditional
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in essentially the same form as for satisfaction theory: in many cases in which
we must change the input context to meet this presuppositional requirement, it
seems as though we do so by not only setting the conditional probability of P on
A high, but also setting the unconditional probability of P high. This will be so in
the case of Geurts’ (5) (we not only set the conditional probability of Theo has
a wife on Theo hates sonnets high; we also set the unconditional probability of
Theo has a wife high). In other cases, however, as in the case (9), it seems that
we only update by setting the conditional probability of P on A high, without
making P unconditionally probable (we set the probability of Buganda has a
king on Buganda is a monarchy high, without making it unconditionally probable
that Buganda has a king).
Lassiter proposes to make sense of this situation as follows. Suppose that ðIf
A, then BPñ is asserted in a context in which the conditional probability of P on
A is not yet high. On Lassiter’s theory, speakers must change the context—they
must ‘accommodate,’ to extend the ordinary usage of that word—to ensure that
the conditional probability of P on A is above a threshold t. It follows that, rela-
tive to the posterior probability function p′ (the probability function that results
from this accommodation), p′(P|A)≥ t. Now suppose further that A and P are
probabilistically independent in c, and that this probabilistic independence is pre-
served through the process of accommodation. Now, by the assumption that P and
A are probabilistically independent under p′, and the standard definition of con-
ditional probability9 (assuming p(A) > 0), p′(P|A) = p′(P∩A)p′(A) = p
′(P)p′(A)
p′(A) = p
′(P).
That is, when P and A are probabilistically independent under p′, the conditional
probability of P on A under p′ is equal to the unconditional probability of P under
p′. So, since p′(P|A) ≥ t, it follows that p′(P) ≥ t. Thus the posterior context
will support P (in the probabilistic sense of assigning suitably high probability),
and not just A ⊃ P. In short, if A and P are probabilistically independent in a
context, and that probabilistic independence is preserved through the process of
accommodation, then the posterior context will support P, and not just A⊃ P.
This solution promises to make sense of the contrast between our two key
examples in very similar ways to van Rooij’s proposal. In most contexts, Theo
hates sonnets will be treated as probabilistically independent of Theo has a wife;
so when we update the context to make the conditional probability of the latter
on the former high, we will also thereby update to make the unconditional
probability of Theo has a wife high. By contrast, Buganda has a king and Buganda
is a monarchy will not in most contexts be treated as probabilistically independent:
the latter will usually probabilify the former. So when we update contexts to
make the conditional probability of the former on the latter high, we will typically
not strengthen to make the unconditional probability of the former on the latter
satisfaction theory, though the common ground here need not have the iterated structure characteristic of
the common ground in standard formulations of satisfaction theory—an issue which does not bear on our
claims here.
9On which p(A|B) = p(A∩B)p(B) provided p(B)> 0.
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high.
So far, this account is very similar to van Rooij’s, albeit with a probabilistic
rather than qualitative notion of independence. In some other cases, van Rooij’s
and Lassiter’s accounts diverge. One point of departure comes from cases where
qualitative and probabilistic independence come apart. A second divergence
comes from cases in which A and P are not intuitively independent in any sense,
but rather A decreases the probability of P—that is, p(P|A)< p(P). In that case,
assuming, again, that this property of probability distributions is preserved across
accommodation, if the posterior probability function p′ has p′(P|A) ≥ t, then,
since p′(P) ≥ p′(P|A), we will also have p′(P) ≥ t. Lassiter gives examples
that suggest that, indeed, we strengthen presuppositions not only when the
antecedent and consequent are independent, but also when the antecedent
disprobabilizes the consequent.10 For this reason, Lassiter takes his account to
be more general than independence-based accounts such as van Rooij’s.
5 THE PROBLEM: PRESERVATION THROUGH ACCOMMODATION
These stories are elegant and insightful, and there is much to like about them. But
our exposition makes clear that both approaches make a crucial assumption: that
the relevant kinds of independence (and, in Lassiter’s case, disprobabilization)
properties will generally be preserved across presupposition accommodation.11,12
Thus, for instance, focusing first on van Rooij’s theory, we want to predict that
when we accommodate the conditional presupposition (6), it will be strengthened
to the unconditional (12):
(6) Theo hates sonnets ⊃ Theo has a wife.
(12) Theo has a wife.
To predict this strengthening, we must assume that Theo has a wife is qualitatively
independent of Theo hates sonnets. This assumption perfectly plausible for most
‘default’ contexts. In general, there is no reason to think that, in a given context,
we would, for example, leave open that Theo does or does not hate sonnets, but
assume that either he doesn’t hate sonnets, or he has a wife (one way to violate
qualitative independence). And, likewise, in general, there is no reason to think
Theo hating sonnets is probabilistically relevant to his having a wife.
But these assumptions are not yet sufficient to account for the strengthening
of (6) to (12). What we need, moreover, is the claim that this independence
assumption persists even after the context is updated with the material conditional
(6) by way of presupposition accommodation. Without this assumption, again,
10P disprobabilizes Q relative to p iff p(Q|P)< p(Q).
11We here again note that this assumption arises only as part of our extension of their accounts to deal
with the crucial case of accommodation; again, they themselves do not explicitly discuss such cases, and
hence do not directly address the proviso problem.
12See Franke 2007, Francez 2015, Goebel 2017 for related points about different formulations of in-
dependence conditions.
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we do not have what we need. The qualitative independence of Theo hates sonnets
and Theo has a wife in the antecedent context does not yet get us strengthening;
it is only if these remain independent after (6) is accommodated that we know
(6) will be strengthened to (12).
Likewise, in Lassiter’s framework, we want to predict that when we adjust
the input context to make the conditional probability of Theo has a wife on
Theo hates sonnets high, we will also make the unconditional probability of
Theo has a wife high. To predict this, we must assume that Theo has a wife is
probabilistically independent of (or disprobabilized by) Theo hates sonnets. As an
assumption about most ‘default’ contexts, the former of these assumptions—that
these propositions are treated as probabilistically independent—seems perfectly
plausible. But that assumption, again, does not yet suffice to ensure that, when
we accommodate to make the conditional probability of Theo has a wife on Theo
hates sonnets high, we also make the unconditional probability of Theo has a
wife high. What we need is the additional assumption that these propositions
remain probabilistically independent after this update. It is only if we make
this assumption that we can conclude that the posterior context assigns high
probability to Theo has a wife.
But what reason do we have to think these will remain independent after
accommodation? One possibility is that van Rooij and Lassiter are implicitly
making the following closely related assumptions, respectively:
QUALITATIVE RESPECT: If A and P are qualitatively independent in
a given context and we accommodate a presupposition of the form
A⊃ P, A and P will remain qualitatively independent in the posterior
context.
PROBABILISTIC RESPECT: If A and P are probabilistically independent
(resp. A disprobabilizes P) in an input context, and we accommo-
date a presupposition that the probability of P on A is high, then
A and P will remain probabilistically independent (resp. A will still
disprobabilize P) in the posterior context.
If these RESPECT principles could be justified, then this would explain why, in van
Rooij’s framework, when A and P are qualitatively independent, we generally
strengthen A⊃ P to P when we accommodate it; and, in Lassiter’s framework,
when A and P are probabilistically independent, or A disprobabilizes P, we
generally make the probability of P high when we accommodate a presupposition
that the conditional probability of P on A is high. And, given the discussion so
far, this result is just what we need to solve the proviso problem (at least modulo
the further issues discussed in the conclusion).
But what could justify these RESPECT principles? Van Rooij and Lassiter do
not discuss them explicitly, and it is hard for us to find a conceptually respectable
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foundation for either one.
The first point to make here is that presupposition accommodation is just
supposed to be change in beliefs (qualitative or probabilistic), and changes in
beliefs do not in general respect independences. To take a simple case, suppose I
think that Bill goes to the party and Sue goes to the party are qualitatively and
probabilistically independent, and that I have no idea whether either is true.
Suppose further I don’t know whether Bill and Sue are dating. Then I learn they
are dating and go everywhere together. Then I should no longer take Bill goes to
the party and Sue goes to the party to be either qualitatively or probabilistically
independent. I should not leave it open that one goes to the party while the other
does not. And I should judge the probability that Sue goes, conditional on the
probability that Bill goes, to be much higher than the unconditional probability
that Bill goes.
Take another case. Suppose we don’t know if either Bill or Ted is going to
the party, and assume that each going is probabilistically independent of the
other going. We are then told simply that the conditional probability is high that
Bill goes, conditional on Ted going. We thus raise our conditional probability of
Bill going, conditional on Ted going. It would be downright weird in this case
to assume probabilistic independence is preserved—something which would
force us to have high probability in the unconditional proposition that Bill goes.
Nothing in what we have learned would justify that.
In addition, updates do not generally maintain disprobabilization. Suppose
I think that Bill and Ted dislike each other, so that Bill goes to the party makes
Ted goes to the party less likely, and I antecedently have no idea whether either
of them will go the party. Now I learn that Ted is in fact certain to go to the
party if Bill does. There is nothing wrong with this update. But in my posterior
probability state, Bill goes to the party obviously no longer disprobabilizes Ted
goes to the party.
It thus is not true that updates preserve independence properties, or disproba-
bilization properties, in general. And, worse, it is precisely updates with material
conditionals or conditional probabilities which seem to be prime candidates
for disrupting independence properties in particular. To return to our example
from the beginning, suppose that Theo hates sonnets and Theo has a wife are an-
tecedently qualitatively independent, and you don’t know whether either is true.
Now suppose you learn the material conditional Either Theo doesn’t hate sonnets,
or he has a wife. Should the two disjuncts remain qualitatively independent?
Intuitively not. You still don’t know whether Theo hates sonnets and whether
he has a wife. But you can now rule out worlds where he both hates sonnets
and doesn’t have a wife. That means that the two propositions are no longer
qualitatively independent.
Likewise, suppose that Theo has a wife and Theo hates sonnets are antecedently
probabilistically independent. Then you learn that the conditional probability
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of Theo has a wife on Theo hates sonnets is high (perhaps by way of learning
a conditional like If Theo hates sonnets, then he is very likely to have a wife).
You now have high credence in Theo having a wife, conditional on his hating
sonnets. But should you preserve probabilistic independence, so that you also
have high credence that Theo has a wife? There is clearly no reason for you to
do so: intuitively, you haven’t learned anything about the chances that Theo has
a wife.
We can make these considerations more precise and general as follows. First
consider the qualitative case. Suppose A and B are qualitatively independent,
with all of A, Ac, B, and Bc compatible with your information state. Then you
learn A⊃ B by adding that content in a minimal way to your antecedent attitude
state. In a standard qualitative framework for modeling belief revision (like AGM
theory [C.E Alchourrón and P. Gärdenfors and D. Makinson, 1985]), the minimal
update amounts to removing just the A∩ Bc worlds from your information state.
Such an update is guaranteed to disrupt the qualitative independence of A and B:
they will no longer be qualitatively independent on the posterior context, since
there will still be A and Bc worlds, but no A∩ Bc worlds.
The overall picture is the same in the probabilistic case, though the details
are more complex. Lassiter, again, takes contexts to be probability functions
rather than sets of worlds, and, again, a conditional with the form ðIf A, then
BPñ will have a presuppositional constraint of the form p(P|A)≥ t, where p is
the probability function of the context and t is a high threshold. There is no
consensus about how to update an arbitrary probability function to meet a new
condition like this, for, importantly, this condition is non-propositional: it does
not amount to learning a proposition (that is, event), and thus does not amount
merely to just conditioning on that proposition.13 However, given the intuitions
elicited above, any plausible rule we adopt to cover this kind of update will not
in general maintain the probabilistic independence of A and P.
Let us briefly consider two prominent such rules for updating one’s probability
function to respect new information about conditional probabilities. One is to
choose a new probability function that minimizes the relative entropy (the
Kullback-Leibler divergence) from the original function (see Kullback and Leibler
1951; this rule is sometimes called infomin, following van Fraassen 1981). The
second rule is suggested by Douven and Romeijn [2011] (following a proposal in
Bradley 2005) in response to van Fraassen’s [1981] Judy Benjamin problem, and
is closely related: this rule minimizes not relative entropy, but rather a closely
related quantity, namely inverse relative entropy. Both rules are laid out fully in
13Jeffrey conditionalization is also not applicable here since one must update a conditional probability
rather than a simple probability. Lassiter himself briefly makes use of graphical models in representing
presuppositional updates, and it is natural to look to graphical models for guidance on this question. But,
first, Lassiter makes explicit that the graphical models are just an expositional tool, and are insufficiently
expressive to model probabilistic presupposition update. Second, graphical models are simply representa-
tions of probability distributions: they do not come with a special update rule. Thus, the problem of how
to update graphical models is just the general problem of how to update probability distributions.
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Appendix C.
The key fact about both rules for present purposes is that both require that,
when we update our probability function to change the probability of P given A,
we ought not to change the conditional probability of P given Ac (provided the
probability of A remains non-maximal, that is, not 0 or 1). This constraint is very
plausible on independent intuitive grounds. Suppose you start out with equal
credence in the propositions that Theo hates sonnets and has a wife, that he
hates sonnets and doesn’t have a wife, that he likes sonnets and has a wife, and
that he likes sonnets and doesn’t have a wife. You learn just that the probability
that Theo has a wife is high conditional on Theo hating sonnets. What should
you think about the probability that he has a wife conditional on Theo not hating
sonnets? Intuitively, this conditional probability should not change at all; you
have learned nothing about the chances that he has a wife conditional on him
not hating sonnets.14 This intuition generalizes: learning just something about
the numerical range of the conditional probability of P on A does not generally
tell us anything about the conditional probability of P on Ac. But any update
rule which satisfies this constraint—which ensures that when we change the
conditional probability of P on A, we leave the conditional probability of P on Ac
unchanged—ensures that, if we start with a probability state in which A and P are
probabilistically independent and the probability of A is non-maximal, and then
update to raise the conditional probability of P on A, we will always get a new
state in which A and P are not independent. Updating conditional probabilities
in a way that respects this very intuitive constraint is thus guaranteed to disrupt
probabilistic independences. More detailed discussion of both rules, and a proof
of this fact, are found in Appendix C.15
Thus, coming back to the proviso problem, not only is it the case that updates
in general do not preserve qualitative or probabilistic independence; worse,
updates with material conditionals and updated conditional probabilities are
prime candidates for disrupting independence properties.
Having said that, it is of course still possible to update with a material condi-
tional or update conditional probabilities in such a way that we maintain inde-
pendence (and disprobabilization) properties, by updating in a non-standard
(and in some obvious sense non-minimal) way. And, if the RESPECT principles
are to be defended, we will have to claim that we do just this when it comes to
presupposition accommodation. That is, we will have to claim that, although
updating with material conditionals and updating conditional probabilities does
not generally respect independence, it does so when we are accommodating a
material conditional/high conditional probability. In those cases, the idea would
14At least if we follow the intuitions put forth by van Fraassen [1981] andBradley [2005]. What we
actually do in any case will depend on the fine details of the case: this formal rule is a kind of posited
default.
15We will not discuss when updates to conditional probabilities preserve disprobabilization properties,
because the failure to preserve independence properties suffices for our point here.
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be, we choose a non-standard update in order to ensure that we preserve the
relevant independence properties.
But why would this be so? We don’t see any independently motivated reason
to adopt this hypothesis, or any respectable way to build it into a semantic
and pragmatic system. Nor do we see any way in which this dialectical move
makes progress on the proviso problem. The proviso problem, again, is the
problem of accounting for stronger-than-expected updates when it comes to
accommodating conditional presuppositions/high conditional probabilities. And
the problem of justifying the RESPECT principles is also the problem of accounting
for stronger-than-expected updates when it comes to accommodating conditional
presuppositions/high conditional probabilities. But this is just the proviso prob-
lem again!
In short: Without the RESPECT principles, the views under consideration have
no empirical plausibility: they fail to make sense of the core cases that they are
designed to capture. The empirical ambitions of the views can be vindicated if
we assume the RESPECT principles. But as a theoretical matter, defending the
RESPECT principles seems very difficult—indeed, the problem of defending these
principles seems to just be the proviso problem.
6 CONCLUSION
We thus do not think that van Rooij and Lassiter’s proposed responses to the
proviso problem are successful as they stand: these proposals contain a serious
lacuna which we do not see a ready way to bridge.
In concluding, let us note a limit to the scope of our criticism. Schlenker
[2011], following Singh [2006], helpfully divides the proviso problem into two
(potentially separate) problems:
(i) Strengthening Problem: By which mechanism can conditional
presuppositions be strengthened?
(ii) Selection Problem: How does one choose among the unstrength-
ened and strengthened presuppositions?
From the point of view of this taxonomy—which is certainly not forced on us
(and which Lassiter and van Rooij do not themselves adopt), but may be helpful
for situating our criticism—both van Rooij [2007] and Lassiter [2012] attempt
to address both problems: as we have seen, they select presuppositions to be
strengthened on the basis of independence (plus, in Lassiter’s case, disprobabi-
lization), and strengthen them using an accommodation mechanism that (they
implicitly assume) satisfies the RESPECT principles. Here we have only shown that
their answer to the Strengthening Problem is inadequate as it stands. For all we
have said, it may well be that independence (of one form or another) still plays
a crucial role in the selection problem: determining which presuppositions to
strengthen. One place for independence to play a crucial role may be in a theory
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like that advanced by Beaver [1992, 2001], on which listeners have plausibility
orderings of some kind over different possible contexts, and use those orderings
to decide which context to update to. Independence-based considerations may
well play a role in that plausibility ordering. This role will be more indirect
than the role played by independence-based considerations in van Rooij’s and
Lassiter’s approach, and our criticism of van Rooij’s and Lassiter’s approach does
not touch Beaver’s approach, which we will not try to evaluate here. Having said
that, there are, however, also significant challenges already in the literature to
using independence for the selection problem. One comes from Geurts [1996],
who points out that even apparently independent material conditionals are not
strengthened when they are presupposed in the scope of a factive attitude verb.
Another comes from Gazdar [1979], Geurts [1996], Mandelkern [2016b], who
note that conditional presuppositions are often strengthened even when they
are intuitively not independent, and that this strengthening cannot be easily
cancelled, casting doubt on the basic idea that the strengthening is pragmatic in
nature. There is much to say about all of these challenges; we raise them here
mainly to distinguish them from our own and review what we take to be the
state of play for independence-based approaches to the proviso problem.
In short: while there may well be a role for independence in a solution to
the proviso problem, there is substantially more work to be done to show that it
can play the kind of role that van Rooij and Lassiter envision for it.
A VAN ROOIJ ’S (2007) NOTION OF INDEPENDENCE
Here we show that the two different ways in which van Rooij [2007] spells
out the notion of independence turn out to be inequivalent, pace van Rooij,
and briefly justify our decision to focus on the second notion. van Rooij 2007
first defines orthogonality of questions (we have changed some terminology and
notation to bring this in line with our own):
ORTHOGONALITY OF QUESTIONS:
Let QP1 and Q
P
2 be two partitions, then we say that Q
P
1 and Q
P
2 are
orthogonal with respect to each other iff ∀q1 ∈ QP1 : ∀q2 ∈ QP2 :
q1 ∩ q2 6=∅.
Van Rooij then defines the question whether A, and then defines the notion of
question independence:
QUESTION WHETHER A:
The question whether A in context s (denoted A?s) is the partition
{A∩ s, Ac ∩ s}.
QUESTION INDEPENDENCE OF A AND B IN CONTEXT s:
14
Formulae A and B are question independent of each other in context
s iff A?s and B?s are orthogonal to each other.
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Van Rooij then defines the notion of qualitative independence, which is the
notion we define in the main text. He then claims the following:
INDEPENDENCE LEMMA
Formula A and B are question independent of each other in context
s iff they are qualitatively independent of each other in s.
But INDEPENDENCE LEMMA is false: the notion of question independence
and qualitative independence come apart. To see this, consider a non-empty
context s which entails A and entails B. Then (1) A∩ s 6= ∅ and B ∩ s 6= ∅
are both true, and so is A∩ B ∩ s 6= ∅; and (2) A∩ s 6= ∅ and Bc ∩ s 6= ∅ are
not both true; and (3) Ac ∩ s 6= ∅ and B ∩ s 6= ∅ are not both true; and (4)
Ac ∩ s 6=∅ and Bc ∩ s 6=∅ are not both true. Thus the four conditions for A and
B to be qualitatively independent of each other in context s are satisfied. But
now note that, by the definition of questions, and the fact that A and B are true
throughout s, it follows that A?s = {s,∅}, and B?s = {s,∅}. By the definition
of orthogonality, it follows that A?s is not orthogonal to B?s, since there is an
element of A?s (namely ∅) whose intersection with an element of B?s is ∅. And
so, by the definition of question independence, we have that A and B are not
question independent of each other in context s. Thus A and B are not question
independent of each other in s, but are qualitatively independent of each other
in s.
In his treatment of the proviso problem, van Rooij does not distinguish
these two notions of independence, since he takes them to be equivalent. But
since they are inequivalent, this raises an interpretive question: which notion of
independence is the one van Rooij is arguing helps with the proviso problem? We
think it is clear that it is qualitative independence, not question independence—
and thus went this way in presenting van Rooij’s view in the main text. The
reason for this is that if A and B are question independent in s, it follows that s
does not entail any of A, B, Ac, or Bc. But then there is no way that the question
independence of A and B in s can ever be part of an explanation of the fact that
s entails B. And van Rooij’s use of independence is supposed to do just that: the
independence of A and P in s, together with the assumption that A is compatible
with s and that A⊃ P is entailed by s, is meant to show that s entails P. This will
not follow if we interpret ‘independence’ as ‘question independence’, but it will
follow if we interpret ‘independence’ as ‘qualitative independence’; and so we
think the latter is the charitable interpretation of van Rooij’s main claims.
16‘Partition’ is sometimes defined in such a way that a partition can have no empty members; given
this definition, van Rooij clearly has in mind a broader construal, on which partitions can have empty
members.
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B QUALITATIVE AND PROBABILISTIC INDEPENDENCE
Here we make clear the relation between qualitative and probabilistic inde-
pendence. Let us restrict our attention to those models with finite outcome
spaces, Ω, where the event space is simply the powerset of Ω, 2Ω (call any
such probability space a finite probability space). Such a model then can be
described simply by an ordered pair 〈W, p〉 of a finite set W and a probability
function p over the powerspace of W . Call the set of all such pairs P. Consider
the natural mapping q from such pairs to sets of worlds: q : P → 2W , where
q(〈W, p〉) = {w ∈W : p({w})> 0}.
Now we can state the relation between van Rooij’s qualitative independence
and probabilistic independence as follows:17
RELATION BETWEEN QUALITATIVE AND PROBABILISTIC INDEPENDENCE:
Given a context c and two propositions A and B, A is qualitatively
independent of B with respect to c iff there is some finite proba-
bility space 〈W, p〉 such that (i) q(〈W, p〉) = c and (ii) A and B are
probabilistically independent in 〈W, p〉.
Proof:
⇒ Given qualitative independence for A and B relative to c, we show that there
is a 〈W, p〉 which meets (i) and (ii). Note first that if c entails A or B or Ac or Bc,
then p(A) or p(B) is 1 or 0, and so probabilistic independence is automatic. Now
suppose otherwise; then we know that in c there are u A∩ B worlds, x A∩ Bc
worlds, y Ac ∩B worlds, and z Ac ∩Bc worlds, for u, x , y, z > 0. Then suppose we
have n probability mass. Let each world in the A∩ B region receive au probability
mass; each world in the A∩ Bc receive bx probability mass; each world in the
Ac ∩ B region receive cy probability mass; and each world in the Ac ∩ Bc region
receive dz probability mass, where a, b, c and d satisfy a + b + c + d = n and
ad = bc (we could do this e.g. by setting all equal to n4). Then we are guaranteed
to have P(A)P(B) = P(A∩ B).
⇐ We show that for arbitrary probability space 〈W, p〉 such that A and B are
probabilistically independent and q(〈W, p〉) = c, qualitative independence holds
for A and B with respect to c. Suppose that c includes A worlds and B worlds.
Then p(A) and p(B) are greater than zero, but then p(A∩ B) = p(A)p(B) > 0,
and so c includes A∩ B worlds. Similar reasoning shows that, if c includes A and
Bc worlds, it includes A∩ Bc worlds, and so on for Ac and B, and for Ac and Bc;
crucial here is the fact that, if A and B are probabilistically independent, then so
are A and Bc, Ac and B, and Ac and Bc.
17See Franke [2007, fn. 2] for a similar observation.
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C UPDATING CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
Finally, we discuss two standard rules for updating conditional probabilities, and
show that both systematically disrupt probabilistic independence. The update
problem that Lassiter’s system gives us can be described as follows. Given a
background probability function p0 according to which A and B are independent,
and non-maximal (i.e. not 0 or 1), and p0(B|A) < t , how do we update p0 to
satisfy the condition that p0(B|A)≥ t? Call the new function after the update p1.
(For simplicity we will assume here that the update is minimal in the sense that
we will have p1(B|A) = t.)
The first method we consider, often called infomin (following van Fraassen
1981; see Kullback and Leibler 1951) is to minimize relative entropy, i.e. the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Relative entropy or KL divergence is a real
number representing the ‘distance’ from one probability function to another.18
For two discrete probability functions p0, p1 over an outcome space A with finest
partition E, we can define the KL divergence to p1 from p0 as follows:
KL(p1, p0) =
∑
i∈E
p1(i)log
p1(i)
p0(i)
Suppose there is some condition T on probability functions that p0 does not
meet. The infomin rule requires that the new probability function p1 will be
such that p1 satisfies T , and for any other probability function p
′ that satisfies T ,
KL(p′, p0)≥ KL(p1, p0). In other words, p1 must be among the ‘closest’ probability
functions that satisfy T , where closeness is measured by KL divergence.19
The second rule, from Douven and Romeijn [2011], minimizes not relative
entropy but rather inverse relative entropy (IRE). For discrete probability func-
tions p0 and p1 over outcome space A with finest partition E, IRE is defined as
follows:
IRE(p1, p0) = KL(p0, p1) =
∑
i∈E
p0(i)log
p0(i)
p1(i)
Both of these rules have the following key property:
PRESERVATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES: Updating a discrete
probability function p to p′ in order to change the conditional proba-
bility of B on A using either the rule minimize KL or the rule minimize
IRE leaves unchanged the conditional probability of B on Ac, provided
both p and p′ assign non-maximal probability to A.
The proof is in a moment. First, note that this fact suffices to guarantee that,
for any discrete probability function p, if p makes B and A probabilistically
18It is non-symmetric in that the distance from p0 to p1 is not always the same as the distance from p1
to p0, hence it is not a measure.
19Our statement of the rule is non-deterministic in cases where their is no unique such function.
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independent, then updating p by either rule to change the conditional probability
of B on A will result in a probability distribution which does not make B and A
probabilistically independent, provided both the original and updated functions
assign A non-maximal probability. In other words, both rules under consideration
are guaranteed to disrupt probabilistic independence in almost every case in
which we use the rule to change a conditional probability of B on A. To see this,
let p(A) 6= 0 and p(A) 6= 1 and let p(B|A) = p(B) = t. Suppose we update to a
new probability distribution p′ which meets the conditions that p′(B|A) = k 6= t
and p′(A) 6= 0 and p′(A) 6= 1 using one of these rules. Since p(B|A) = p(B), it
follows by the law of total probability that p(B|Ac) = p(B); thus p(B|Ac) = t.
Given PRESERVATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES, we have p′(B|Ac) = t. By
the law of total probability, we have p′(B) = p′(B|A)p′(A) + p′(B|Ac)p′(Ac). Thus
p′(B) = kp′(A)+ t p′(Ac). We will have p′(B) = k iff k = t; but k 6= t; so p′(B) 6= k
so p′(B) 6= p′(B|A): A and B are no longer probabilistically independent after our
update.
This makes clear why, under either of these update rules, probabilistic in-
dependence of A and B will not be maintained when we update a probability
distribution to increase the conditional probability of B on A; it also makes clear
how great of an assumption it would be to think that such updates generally
do maintain probabilistic independences, and how much of a departure from
standard ways of thinking about how such updates should go.
The proof of PRESERVATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES is as follows.20
Start with infomin. Consider any discrete probability functions p, p′ over any
event space with finest partition E. Let A be any union of members of E, i.e. any
event, such that both p and p′ assign non-maximal probability to A, and Ac its
complement in the outcome space. First note:
KL(p′, p) =
∑
i∈E&i⊂A
p′(i|A)p′(A)log p′(i|A)p′(A)
p(i|A)p(A) +
∑
i∈E&i⊂Ac
p′(i|Ac)p′(Ac)log p′(i|Ac)p′(Ac)
p(i|Ac)p(Ac)
Next note:
∑
i∈E&i⊂A
p′(i|A)p′(A)log p′(i|A)p′(A)
p(i|A)p(A) = p
′(A)
∑
i∈E&i⊂A
p′(i|A)log p′(i|A)p′(A)
p(i|A)p(A)
= p′(A)
∑
i∈E&i⊂A
p′(i|A)(log p′(i|A)
p(i|A) + log
p′(A)
p(A)
)
= p′(A)log p
′(A)
p(A)
+ p′(A)
∑
i∈E&i⊂A
p′(i|A)log p′(i|A)
p(i|A)
20Thanks to Gary Chamberlain for suggesting this proof method.
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= p′(A)log p
′(A)
p(A)
+ p′(A)KL(p′A, pA)
where pX is the probability function resulting from p conditioned on X . By like
reasoning, we have
∑
i∈E&i⊂Ac
p′(i|Ac)p′(Ac)log p′(i|Ac)p′(Ac)
p(i|Ac)p(Ac) = p
′(Ac)log p
′(Ac)
p(Ac)
+ p′(Ac)KL(p′Ac , pAc)
So we have:
KL(p′, p) = p′(A)log p
′(A)
p(A)
+p′(A)KL(p′A, pA)+p
′(Ac)log p
′(Ac)
p(Ac)
+p′(Ac)KL(p′Ac , pAc)
Obviously the last term is minimized by making p′Ac = pAc , and thus by
preserving all conditional probabilities on Ac. Since we can stipulate this without
affecting the values of the other terms, we know that any function p′ which
minimizes KL from p will have this property. The proof for IRE is essentially
identical; we show that:
IRE(p′, p) = p(A)log p(A)
p′(A)+p(A)IRE(p
′
A, pA)+p(A
c)log
p(Ac)
p′(Ac)+p(A
c)IRE(p′Ac , pAc)
One again, the last term, and the whole equation, is obviously minimized by
making p′Ac = pAc , and thus by preserving all conditional probabilities on A
c.21
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